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1. Introduction: Dove’s argument scheme ‘appeal to visual model’ and the aim of this paper 
 
Ian Dove (in his paper “On Appeals to (Visual) Models”) has developed a nice, concise and very 
helpful theory of an argument scheme called “Appeal to Visual Model”. It captures how we can 
(and sometimes do) reason from an observation on a visual model to a thesis about 
corresponding features in reality. The theory is deliberately (Dove, 2016, p. 1) developed in the 
style of Walton’s “argumentation schemes” (e.g. Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; Walton, 1996) 
and provides, like Walton, a somewhat formal but altogether rather contentual argument scheme 
together with critical questions regarding critical points of the argument. 
 Dove’s (2016) theory is a clear progress because such an analysis of arguments on the 
basis of visual models so long did not exist, because his analysis makes explicit inferential 
relations which in the usual talk on visual arguments are not analyzed (p. 8) and thus brings us 
nearer to an understanding of the rationality behind this reasoning, and because he underpins his 
analysis with some theory on modelling in general. In particular I appreciate Dove’s effort and 
endeavour to make explicit as far as possible what goes on in this kind of reasoning for being 
able to assess it analytically (p. 6). On the other hand, I am critical with respect to Walton’s 
argumentation schemes approach (see Lumer, 2016). Walton has introduced this approach to 
resolve the problem of uncertain, i.e., non-deductive arguments (Walton et al., 2008). Some of 
my main worries with this approach are: It does not provide any underlying theory, no 
epistemological basis of the schemes, so that it remains unclear why we should believe in the 
conclusion after having accepted the premisses and having received satisfying answers to our 
critical questions. Existing inferential relations are not revealed or made explicit. There are no 
clear criteria for assessing individual arguments with the help of the schemes. There is a 
confusingly long list of not systematized contentual schemes, which should be reduced to 
underlying formal argument types. The critical questions sometimes may focus our attention to 
particularly critical points of the argument, but often they only question the truth of some 
premise, and they do not help at all to resolve the problem of argumentative validity. The 
conclusion does not contain any qualifier which captures its degree of uncertainty. Etc. 
 I think these problems can be resolved only by an espistemological approach to 
argumentation. Furthermore, Dove’s analysis of appeals to visual models already have brought 
us rather near to an epistemological analysis of this type of argument. Therefore, in what follows 
I will procede this way. First, I will expose an analysis of appeals to visual models on the basis of 
the epistemological approach to argumentation, thereby using Dove’s very instructive examples. 
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Subsequently I will compare Dove’s Waltonian theory of the appeal to visual models with this 
epistemological analysis and in doing so assess the relative advantages of both approaches. 
 
2.  An epistemological analysis of appeals to visual models 
 
Dove provides two extensive examples of appeals to visual models. The first is a reasoning about 
the quickest route from the present position to a nearby pub. There are three proposals of routes 
which on the one hand differ in length but on the other may be quicker in spite of exceeding 
length because of avoiding time-consuming obstacles, namely crossing slow intersections, since 
the route passes less intersections or / and some intersections are provided with pedestrian 
bridges. As the situation is somewhat confusing the persons involved consult a map from which 
the distances can be read, the intersections can be counted and the footbridges individuated. With 
the help of this information the quickest route is determined. The second example regards an x-
ray on which the doctor individuates a bright line in the representation of a bone and infers from 
this that the respective bone has a hairline fracture. 
 The map and the x-ray respectively are, of course, the models which represent aspects of 
some part of the original: the town and the bone. And the features read from the model or, more 
precisely, observed in the model and then possibly formulated as ‘this route (on the map) is about 
10 cm long’ or ‘here is a bright line within the representation of the bone’ etc. are used to infer on 
corresponding features of the original reality, i.e. the length of the real route and the fracture 
respectively. This inference is made possible because of the isomorphy between the original and 
the model. What is an isomorphy? An isomorphy is a relation which holds between two 
structures, A and B, each of which consist of a set of objects, a° and b°, and a set of relations, F° 
and G°, holding between them. Such structures A and B are isomorphic if two conditions are 
fulfilled: 1. Bijective mapping: There is a bijective (or one-to-one) mapping  between the 
objects of A and the objects of B as well as between the relations holding in A and the relations 
holding in B; i.e., to every object ai of A exactly one object bi of B is assigned, and vice versa; 
and to every relation Fi in A exactly one relation Gi in B is assigned, and vice versa. 2. 
Homomorphism: If a relation Fi between the objects a1, …, an (Fi(a1, …, an)) holds in A the 
corresponding relation Gi between the corresponding objects b1, …, bn in B holds as well, and 
vice versa. 
 (A somewhat more formal definition of ‘isomorphy’ is this:  
 
Formal definition of ‘isomorphic’: 
Two structures A  (A = (a°; F°) ) and B (B = (b°; G°) ), consisting of the sets a° 
and b° of objects (a° = {a1, a2, ..., an}; b° (= {b1, b2, ..., bn}) and appertaining sets 
F° and G° of relations (F° = {F1, F2, ..., Fm}; G° = {G1, G2, ..., Gm} holding with 
respect to these objects, are isomorphic iff: 
There is image function  between A und B, for which holds: 
1.  ist bijective, i.e.: 1.1.  is a one-one mapping between the sets of objcetcs a° 
and b° of A and B [which thus assigns to each ai from a° exactly one element bj of 
b° and vice versa (so for all ai and bj holds: (ai)=bj and (bj)=ai)]; and 1.2.  is 
a one-one mapping between the sets F° und G° of functions of A und B [which 
thus assigns to every relation Fi one-to-one a relation Gj (with the same number of 
places (i.e. for all Fi and Gj holds: (Fi)=Gj and (Gj)=Fi)]. And 
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2.  ist homomorph, i.e.: a1, ..., an Fi: (Fi(a1, ..., an))  (Fi)((a1), ..., (an)) 
[i.e. if a relation Fi holds between some objects a1, …, an of A the corresponding 
relation of B (i.e. Gi) must hold between the corresponding objects of a1, …, an 
(i.e b1, …, bn), and vice versa].) 
 
 If we regard e.g., city maps, the original structure A is the city and the map is the model 
B. If the map is of the North-American style the bijective relation, with respect to objects, 
regards, among others, in reality: streets, geodetic positions, measures of angles as well as 
measures of distances and on the the map: black lines, positions on the map (expressible in 
coordinates) again measures of angles as well as measures of distances (cf. table 1). The bijective 
relation between these two sets of objects is defined: for the streets, via writing street names next 
to the respective lines on the map; for the geodetic position by orienting the map such that north 
is up, sometimes by a grid of latitudinal and longitudinal lines but for city-maps mostly only by 
writing the city’s name on the map; for the measures of angles the assignment is not made 
explicit but it is the identity relation, so that to an angle of 40° in reality also 40° on the map are 
assigned; and for the measures of distances the assignment is made via the scale written 
somewhere on the map, such that for a 1:10,000 scale e.g., to 1 km in reality are assigned 10 cm 
on the map. (More differentiated maps represent much more types of objects: kinds of streets, 
buildings, parks, forests, meadows, railway lines etc.; and the bijective attribution, with respect 
to the type of objects, is defined in the explanation of symbols, e.g., national roads are 
represented by yellow lines with black borders.) The bijective assignment of relations for city 
maps regards, primarily, geodetic position of objects in reality and position of symbols in the 
coordinate system of the map and, secondarily, among others lengths of objects as well as angles 
of boundaries of objects in reality and extensions of symbols as well as angles of intersecting or 
touching lines on the map. Because these assignments of relations are intuitive, usually they are 
not made explicit. Homomorphism then is reached by designing a precise map such that all 
objects of the kind of objects which the map promises to represent are represented on the map by 
the respective symbols and that these symbols are at the “right” place on the map. 
  The isomorphic relation of models to reality should be clearly defined, which implies that 
the bijective mapping is restricted to clearly defined sets of objects and relations. This means, 
negatively, that if the model is not a (exact) copy certain kinds of objects and many relations are 
not represented in the model. It is characteristic of models that the isomorphy between the reality 
and the model is intentionally and (hopefully) precisely created, either in single steps, manually 
so to speak—as it is the case of maps or schemata of other things like parental relations, 
genealogical trees of species, curves of population growth—or mechanically by respective 
devices—as e.g., with photographs, x-rays, electrocardiograms, automatically created 
temperature or humidity curves. This implies that models, as far as they are precise and as far as 
the isomorphy (the bijective relation) goes, can serve as a more or less certain basis for 
inferences on the represented reality. Within the respective argument—at least in its ideal 
completely explicit form—then a proposition on the general isomorphy relation between the 
respective part of reality and the model will be the major premise. And the truth of this premise 
is guaranteed by the creator of the model, on whose sincerity and preciseness the arguer relies. 
Since ismorphism is a strong relation this premise, together with premisses on the bijective 
relations and on observations regarding specific features of the model, allows deductive 
inferences to strong conclusions about reality. 
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Table 1: Isomorphy of a city and a city map: 
 
Reality: city Model: city map (Way of) bijective assignment 
1.1. Objects   
streets black lines street names on the map 
geodetic position position on the map, 
coordinates 
north up, grid of latitudinal and 
longitudinal lines, city name 
on the map 
measures of angles  measures of angles identity relation (implicit) 
distances distances scale written on the map 
1.2. Relations   
geodetic position of objects (‘x 
is at position y’) 
positions of symbols on the 
map (‘x is at position y’) 
intuitive, not made explicit 
lenght of an object (‘x is y 
meters long’) 
length of objects on the map 
(‘x is y cm long’) 
intuitive, not made explicit 
angles of boundaries of objects 
(‘the touching boundaries of 
object x and of object y stand 
with the angle z to each other’) 
angles of intersecting or 
touching lines (‘line x and line 
y stand with the angle z to each 
other’) 
intuitive, not made explicit 
2. Homomorphism   
Baker St is 1 km long. The black line with the name 
“Baker St” aside is 10 cm 
long. 
 
Baker St and Cesar St intersect 
with a right angle. 
The black line with the name 
“Baker St” aside and the black 
line with the name “Cesar St” 
aside intersect with a right 
angle. 
 
 
 
 Let us make this idea more precise. What premisses do we need for an ideal, i.e., fully 
explicit and argumentatively valid, appeal to (visual) models? First, we need as the major 
premise a proposition on the isomorphic relation between the model and reality, then the premise 
reporting the observation on the model. For making the inference to the corresponding feature of 
reality deductively valid we next need premisses saying that the observed feature is part of the 
model structure—and not e.g., a stain or advertising on the map—and premisses about the 
bijective correspondences between the observed objects of the model and the represented objects 
as well as between the observed kind of relation and the represented relation. Finally, for being 
able to deductively exploit the isomorphy premise we need the isomorphy definition as kind of 
(analytically true) connecting premise. Together, this is sufficient to then infer to the conclusion 
about the feature of reality represented by what has been observed on the model. Alltogether we 
thus get the following argument scheme: 
 
Argument scheme ‘appeal to a (visual) model’: 
Pi0: Isomorphy Definition: See above. 
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Pi1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: Structure B (with the set b° of objects 
and the set G° of relations) is a model of the real structure A (with the set a° of 
objects and the set F° of relations) such that between B and A the isomorphy 
relation  holds. 
Pi2: Model Affiliation: The objects b1, …, bn are elements of the set of objects 
(b°) of the model (B); the relation G is element of the set of representing relations 
G° of the model (B). 
Pi3: Observation on the Model: Between the objects b1, …, bn the relation G holds. 
Pi4: Object Correspondences: The counterpart of b1 (defined by the isomorphy 
function ) in reality A is a1; …; the counterpart of bn (defined by the isomorphy 
function ) in reality is an. 
Pi5: Relation Correspondence: The counterpart of the relation G (defined by the 
isomorphy function ) in reality is the relation F. 
Ci: Conclusion: Reality Statement: Between the real objects a1, …, an the relation 
F holds. 
 
(A somewhat more formal scheme is: 
 
Formal argument scheme ‘appeal to a (visual) model’: 
Pf0: Isomorphy Definition: See above. 
Pf1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: The structure B (b°; G°) is a correct 
model of the real structure A (a°; F°), such that between B and A the isomorphy 
relation  holds. 
Pf2: Model Affiliation: b1, …, bn  b°; G  G°. 
Pf3: Observation on the Model: G(b1, …, bn). 
Pf4: Object Correspondences: (b1) = a1; …; (bn) = an. 
Pf5: Relation Correspondence: (G) = F. 
Cf: Conclusion: Reality Statement: F(a1, …, an). ) 
 
 Taking up Dove’s first extended example, an ideal, fully explicit appeal to a visual model 
would be this:  
 
Example of an ideal appeal to visual model: 
Pe0: Isomorphy Definition: See above. 
Pe1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: Map B is a model of the street 
structure of city A in the sense that between B and A holds the isomorphy relation 
 (in the North-American style of city maps: streets are represented by black 
lines, …; the scale is 1:10,000 …). 
Pe2: Model Affiliation: The black lines on the map labeled “Admiral St”, “Baker 
St”, “Cesar St”, “Dundas St”, “Elvis St” and “Fitzgerald St” as well as the lines 
between them and the distance of 10 cm are part of the model (i.e., they are part of 
the representing features of the map). 
Pe3: Observation on the Model: The (shortest) connection of lines from the 
intersection of the lines labeled “Admiral St” and “Baker St” to the intersection of 
the lines labeled “Cesar St” and “Dundas St” which includes / passes the 
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intersection of the lines labeled “Elvis St” and “Fitzgerald St” (on the map B) is 
10 cm long. 
Pe4: Object Correspondences: The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines 
labeled “Admiral St” and “Baker St” on the map is the crossroads Admiral St / 
Baker St (where we are now). The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines 
labeled “Cesar St” and “Dundas St” is the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St (where 
the pub is). The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines labeled “Elvis St” 
and “Fitzgerald St” is the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St. The real counterpart 
of the black lines connecting these three points on the map are the streets 
connecting the three crossroads. The real counterpart of a distance of 10 cm on the 
map is 1 km. 
Pe5: Relation Correspondence: The real counterpart of the relation ‘distance’ on 
the map is (again) the distance. 
Ce: Conclusion: Reality Statement: The (shortest) route from the crossroads 
Admiral St / Baker St (where we are now) to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St 
(where the pub is) which passes the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 1 km 
long. 
 
The inference made in this argument is deductively valid. (And it is analytically valid if we leave 
out the analytically true definition of ‘isomorphic’.) The advantage of this extended, ideal 
version of the argument is to make the inferential validity clear. Its disadvantage is, of course, 
that it is long and laborious. The latter problem is resolved by an enthymematic and otherwise 
simplified version of this argument, which leaves out the isomorophy definition, the Model 
Affiliation premise, several of the Correspondence premisses and simplifies some formulations. 
The result could be this: 
 
Ps1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: B is a map of city A (with the scale 
1:10,000). 
Ps3: Observation on the Model: On the map the route from the crossroads 
Admiral St / Baker St to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St via the crossroads 
Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 10 cm long. 
Ps4: Object Correspondence: 10 cm on the map correspond to 1 km in reality. 
Cs: Conclusion: Reality Statement: The route from the crossroads Admiral St / 
Baker St to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St via the crossroads Elvis St / 
Fitzgerald St is 1 km long. 
 
The descriptions in the Observation Premise Ps3 and in the Conclusion Cs are still laborious. If 
the arguer has the map in front of herself and her addressee, she will say instead: Pss3: ‘We are 
here’, thereby pointing to a point in the map, continue with: ‘The pub is there’, thereby pointing 
to another point on the map, and then go on with: ‘This route …’, thereby following with her 
finger the respective lines on the map from the starting point to the destination, ‘… is 10 cm 
long’. And the conclusion may be reduced to: Css: ‘This means this route / route 1 / the route via 
the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 1 km long.’ I repeat, this possibility is given only if the 
map is present. As Dove (2016) rightly says, this indexical way of referring to the objects the 
argument is about does not change the substance of the inference (p. 5). But it moves us still 
further away from the ideal version, which makes the inferential relation fully transparent. 
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 The exemplary argument reconstructed so far is only one elementary argument within the 
complex argument sketched by Dove about what is the quickest route to the pub. Other parts of 
the complex argument which are again appeals to visual models regard the number of crossroads 
to be crossed and the situation of pedestrian bridges. To proceed with the argument, further 
empirical information is needed, which cannot be read off the map but may be part of the 
common knowledge of the persons involved, namely walking speed and the (medium) time to be 
spent for crossing the various crossroads. The speed information together with the lenghts of the 
routes permits us to calculate the net walking times; adding the waiting times for the crossroads 
without pedestrian bridges finally leads to the gross walking times. The final piece of the 
argument is to establish the route with the shortest gross walking time. All these further parts, 
i.e., further elementary arguments, within the complex argument are analytically valid, hence 
deductively valid, if the empirical premisses and lemmata are supplemented by analytically true 
premisses. This means even the complex argument (if supplemented by the analytically true 
premisses) is deductive. For making it an argumentatively valid argument (which implies among 
others also soundness), of course, now the empirical premisses have to be true, and the fitting 
premisses have to be filled in (as required by the argument’s structure, to make the inferences in 
fact deductively valid). 
 That the basic structure of the appeal to visual model is deductive may be surprising. But 
it is good news since this fact reduces this type of argument to one subform of a well-studied 
general class of arguments, for which the epistemological basis is clear, namely deductive logic 
with its transfer of the truth-value ‘true’ from the premisses to the conclusion. (The just stated 
deductive character of appeals to visual models presupposes that the premisses are not restricted 
by qualifiers. Such a restriction, however, may sometimes be necessary, in particular if the model 
is not precise or contains errors. In such a case the isomorphy premise could be weakened to a 
statistical proposition, saying that the relation of isomorophy holds only extensively, e.g., only 
for 99% of the representations, but not always. In this case the argument has to be transformed 
into a probabilistic argument with a probabilistic conclusion. But for probabilistic arguments we 
have epistemological analyses as well, which justify these arguments with the help of probability 
theory (cf. Lumer, 2011).) Having arrived at this point, no further epistemological analysis of the 
appeal to visual model is required. Hence we can now compare the epistemological analysis of 
the appeal to visual model with Dove’s respective theory. 
 
3. Comparing Dove’s theory of appeals to visual models and the epistemological analysis 
 
Dove’s (2016) final argument scheme is:  
 
Dove’s “Appeal to Visual Model:  
[PD1:] Representation Relation: R models O.  
[PD2:] Reasoning On Model: In R, r obtains.  
[CD:] Conclusion: In O, o obtains (where o is the feature represented by r in R).” 
(p. 6; insertions in square brackets by me, C.L.) 
 
The proper scheme is complemented by the following critical questions: 
 
CQ1: “Is the representation / model adequate for the given reasoning?” 
CQ2: “Does the representation / model accurately portray the relevant relations?” 
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CQ3: “Is the result, r on R, properly attributed?” 
CQ4: “Are there competing representations / models of O?” (Dove, 2016, p. 7) 
 
 Though Dove’s schematization of the appeal to visual models is an important step and 
progress I think it is still lacking in several respects.  
 1. What bothers me most is that his scheme does not represent a deductively or 
analytically valid inference, though, as has just been shown, appeals to visual models can be 
analyzed and reduced to deductive arguments. Without such a kind of reduction or an alternative 
foundation, which Dove however does not provide, the arguments and the argument scheme 
remain unjustified and their merits unclear. Why should we trust such an argument, i.e. believe 
the conclusion, if the premisses are fulfilled? Instead of providing such a justificatory reduction, 
Dove complements the scheme by the critical questions. But as in Walton’s approach, these 
critical questions cannot substitute an epistemological justification of the scheme (see below). 
(By the way, Walton developed his argumentation schemes approach with the critical questions 
for resolving the problem of uncertain arguments. If, however, appeals to visual models can be 
analyzed as deductive and therefore certain arguments, bringing in the argumentation schemes 
approach with the critical questions should be superfluous even in Walton’s terms. And it does 
not resolve the justification problem anyway.) 
 2. One could try to move on from Dove’s scheme to a deductively (or at least 
analytically) valid scheme by transforming the parenthesis in his conclusion CD into an 
additional premise: PD3: ‘r in R represents o in O.’ However, this would not yet suffice. First, 
the premise PD1 on the Representation Relation, that “R models O” is quite unclear. It should be 
analyzed and made precise in a way that also entails taking up the notion ‘x represents y’, now 
mentioned in PD3, and that, in the end, can make the argument deductively valid. This could be 
done by appealing to the isomorphy relation – as has been done in my epistemological analysis. 
Second, still a further premise, viz. on the model affiliation of what has been observed and is 
now described in premise PD2, would be missing. Third, the described model feature “r” usually 
is a state of affairs, i.e., an n-adic relation between objects. The bijective mapping of the 
isomorphy relation between reality and the model, however, is not primarily defined for states of 
affairs but for objects and relations, such that the counterpart of the state of affairs in the model 
has to be composed by relying on these more elementary mappings (cf. the premisses Pi4 on 
Object Correspondences and Pi5 on the Relation Correspondence in my own account). 
 3. A minor problem is that in Dove’s descriptions the meaning of “r” is not entirely clear. 
In the analyzed examples r sometimes is a mere observational statement—like “white line” in an 
x-ray (Dove, 2016, p. 5); on other occasions it seems to be already an interpretation—like: a 
certain route on the map “appears quickest” (p. 5). If r is an observation statement it remains 
unclear how the step from this observation to the realistic interpretation can be justified. If r is 
instead an interpreation it is not clear how this interpretation itself is justified.  
 4. Dove explicitly refuses to analyze appeals to visual models with the help of the 
isomorphy relation (Dove, 2016, p. 3). His reason for this refusal is: For most (non-scientific) 
purposes the isomorphism requirement would be too strong; models represent only some features 
of the original accurately (p. 3). Instead of the isomorphy relation he wants to rely on the 
similarity relation (p. 3). Perhaps the reason for rejecting isomorphism as the basis of his 
approach relies simply on a misunderstanding. Isomorphism does not imply that the original is 
completely reproduced; exactly to the contrary, the extension of the isomorphism can precisely 
be defined, such that e.g., houses or trees or park benches are excluded from the representation in 
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a map. The similarity relation, on the other hand, is much too unclear and vague as to be apt to 
provide the conceptual basis of a reconstruction of appeals to visual models which make their 
rationale clear. And the similarity relation is an understatement of what a real model claims to 
achieve. In refusing an analysis with the help of the isomorophy relation Dove exactly rejects 
what would be the basis for a precise reconstruction of appeals to visual models. Furthermore, 
often the model is not similar—at least in the everyday sense—to the represented reality: think 
e.g., of representing time in a two dimensional space with the help of a time bar with insertions 
of event descriptions, or a temperature curve over time, or the representation of atmospheric 
pressure over time by a pressure curve, or its spatial distribution by a map with isobars, or the 
representation of parental relations with the help of a genealogic tree. 
 5. Dove’s critical questions help to be attentive to certain critical points in appeals to 
visual models. However, they do not clarify or guarantee the appeal’s validity; and for the 
deductive reconstruction of the appeal they are superfluos. CQ1 asks for the model’s adequacy to 
provide the required information. However, if the model is not adequate in this respect, the 
desired conclusion cannot be derived; a fortiori, no argument has to be assessed. (Or if, 
alternatively, the desired conclusion is inferred to nonetheless, either some premise is false or the 
conclusion is not valid. Both cases are captured by traditional criteria for good deductive 
arguments.) CQ2, whether the model accurately represents the relevant relations, is a question 
for the truth of the premise PD1 on the Representation Relation (‘R models O’). Hence CQ2 and 
the answer to it do not provide anything new beyond the original argument; the question is only 
an invitation to carefully examine the premise. (One could interpret PD1 also differently, much 
weaker, as saying only that R models O in some way without implying the correctness of the 
model. In this case the answer to CQ2 would provide new information. But this information then 
should be included among the premisses in the first place.) CQ3 is rather unclear to me. Finally, 
CQ4, regarding competing models, is only a particular way to ask for the premisses’ truth: If 
there is a competing model which, in addition, is also correct then the used model is not correct. 
And this means premise PD1 (on the representational relation) is false. Altogether, then, the 
critical questions and the answers to them do not provide anything new beyond the original 
argument—if this argument was valid and sound. Hence they do not provide something which 
can justify reliance on the inconclusive argument scheme. 
 These criticisms show that though Dove’s theory of the appeal to visual model is an 
important progress it can still be improved. And I hope to have shown that the approach 
developed here is such an improvement since it does not have the problems just listed. However, 
my approach dismisses the Waltonian framework of argumentation schemes. Instead it is 
epistemological, i.e., it tries to provide a firm epistemological basis for the schematized type of 
argument ‘appeal to visual model’, which in this case is deductive logic. 
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